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The Law of Submarine Warfare Today
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Introduction

T

he roles of military submarines have evolved throughout the twentieth
century. In wartime, these roles have included coastal defense,
harassment of enemy fleets, and, especially in World War II, hunting and
destroying the seaborne commerce that supported the enemy's war efforts.
Today, two principal roles for u.s. submarines, at least in any future war
with the Soviet Union, are probably as anti-submarine weapons (attack
submarines) and as strategic weapons platforms (ballistic missile submarines).
Other missions, however, could include coastal defense, attacks on the
enemy's surface fleet, projection of force ashore, and commerce warfare.1
The laws of war have never been comfortable with the submarine's unique
combination of stealth and vulnerability. As will be explained below, it is
this peculiar mix of strength and weakness that can be blamed as the root
cause of the legal dilemma, particularly as it relates to the submarine's role
as a commerce raider. The legal responses to this twentieth-century weapons
platform have ranged from early proposals for its abolition to justification
of its use under the rules of reprisal to tolerance of it as an effective war
machine with characteristics that regrettably require some adjustments in the
traditional laws of war.
The U.s. Navy's new Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
(NWP 9) includes references to the laws of naval warfare that specifically
address the submarine weapons system and also rules that apply, or can apply,
to submarines and their roles in wartime. The ultimate purpose of this chapter
is to analyze these direct and some of the indirect references to the law of
submarine warfare. Before that discussion, however, the chapter will first
briefly review the history of both the submarine as a weapons system and
earlier approaches to the legal dilemma presented by the submarine and its
wartime uses. Next, today's submarines and their wartime roles will be
described. This will be followed by a discussion of the present state of the
law of submarine warfare. Finally, the chapter will point out and analyze
the submarine references in the Commander's Handbook.
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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History2
The submarine is a war machine of the twentieth century. Although
documented uses of submersible devices against the enemy in wartime
occurred as early as the American Revolutionary War, and in fact the
submarine's legality was considered at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference,
deployment of submarines as a significant part of a nation's naval forces began
only in the early years of the present century. Certainly the international
law issues that form the core of the current chapter achieved real significance
only with the conduct of naval warfare during the First World War.
The main advantage of a submarine over a surface warship is, of course,
its underwater capability. Militarily, this translates into the ability to hide
from the enemy and the ability to approach a target from its hidden position
to carry out surprise attacks. The disadvantages of the submarine can be
viewed as the price it must pay for the principal advantage of stealth, and
these disadvantages, especially for earlier submarines, have been considerable.
Submarines used by the belligerents in bpth world wars were small and
cramped . .They were slow when running submerged on batteries, which they
could not do for long periods of time without coming to the surface to
recharge, and were not all that fast when running on the surface under diesel
power. Moreover, unlike heavily armed surface warships, the submarines of
the world wars were vulnerable on the surface to attacks, even from lightly
armed merchant vessels, and to rammings. While these submarines were
armed with deck guns and were also capable of laying mines, their principal
weapon was the self-propelled torpedo.
At the start of the First World War, submarines were assigned the roles
of coastal defense against enemy warships and harassment of enemy warship
fleets. Partly because of their disadvantages-low escape speeds, limited
submerged times, vulnerability to attack on the surface-they were soon
assigned the task of interdicting the seaborne commerce traffic that supported
the enemy's war effort. This role of commerce raider then became the main
wartime assignment for German submarines in World War I and the
submarines of most of the belligerents in World War II. As we shall see,
it is the anti-commerce role that has created the largest set of legal
controversies concerning the military uses of submarines.
Since the Second World War, the evolution of the military submarine has
proceeded in giant strides. With new developments have come new projected
wartime roles and reconsideration of some of the earlier roles. The harnessing
of nuclear energy, for propulsion and for weapons, has probably affected the
nature and role assignments of the submarine more than any other preexisting
war machine. Nuclear powered submarines are relieved of the necessity to
surface or come to shallow snorkel depth to recharge batteries and can
consequently remain in submerged hiding for extremely long time periods
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and underwater transits. And, because the undersea remains an excellent place
of concealment despite improved anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) devices and
techniques, modern nuClear powered submarines have proved effective in
their postwar deterrent role as roving submerged platforms for nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles.
Other new developments in the design and construction of submarines have
provided them with greater underwater speed, enough speed to match that
of most surface warships (although this comparison probably says as much
or more about the development of surface fleets as it does about submarine
advances). Weaponry for submarines has also expanded in variety and range.
While presumably only strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) are armed with
ballistic missiles for their special deterrent role, the other principal category
of submarines, attack submarines (SSNs, if nuclear powered, almost
exclusively the case in the u.s. Navy today; SSs, if diesel-electric powered)
have had their weapons array and targeting systems enhanced in recent years.
Torpedoes have been greatly improved, of course, but modern attack
submarines are now capable of launching a variety of anti-ship, antisubmarine, and land-target missiles, including cruise missiles, with
conventional or nuclear warheads. Moreover, most of these weapons can be
launched at much greater distances from the targets-even over the horizonthan was true for submarine weapons during the world wars. Today's
submarines are also capable of sophisticated mine-laying.
Because of these advances, today's fighting submarines are in many respects
as different from those that fought in World War I as those early submarines
were different from the surface naval vessels that preceded and coexisted with
them. But it is this earlier distinction that caused the initial legal controversy,
a dispute that continues to this day. Indeed, the entire twentieth-century
history of the submarine as a major implement of naval warfare has occurred
in the face of attempts to apply to submarines laws of war that were essentially
devised to regulate the use oflatter-nineteenth-century surface warships, and
in particular the interaction of these surface vessels with merchant shipping
of the same time period. It is not surprising that some legal friction has
resulted.
Arising out of the closely related principles of militalY necessity and
humanity, the relevant laws of war were, and are, designed to protect
noncombatant crews and passengers aboard merchant ships where
circumstances make these vessels legitimate objects for destruction by a
belligerent in wartime. The 1908 Declaration of London stated the rule that
a neutral merchant vessel (assuming it was otherwise lawful to sink it) could
be sunk by a belligerent ship only after the warship had provided for the safety
of the passengers and crew. 3 This might be accomplished by taking the
protected persons on board the warship or another vessel and later
transporting them to an appropriate port or, where geography and sea
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conditions were favorable, placing the passengers and crew members in the
merchant ship's lifeboats with some good assurance that they could safely
reach a nearby shore. Although this rule said nothing about enemy merchant
ships, other rules of naval warfare of course generally allowed the sinking
of an enemy warship in non-neutral waters without warning or removal of
combatant crew members.4
The First World War provided the test for compliance with these rules
by submarines. As noted above, the main advantage of the submarine is its
capability for surprise attack from its underwater hiding place. Because of
its slow underwater speed, its limited submerged time, and its vulnerability
on the surface, however, the World War I submarine was usually not much
of a match for the warships of the enemy's surface fleet. Surface warships
were too fast for a submarine running submerged, and the most important
targets-battleships-were very difficult to sink. Even if a submarine was
successful in striking a legitimate warship target, other ships in the enemy
fleet were likely to detect and chase down the submarine and attack it with
depth charges or force it to the surface, where its destruction or capture was
virtually assured. Isolated, older second-line warships and, then, merchant
ships thus became the preferred targets for submarines.
In accordance with the traditional rules reflected at least in part by the
London Declaration of 1909,5 a merchant vessel that was found to be in some
way supporting the enemy's war effort-for example by carrying a cargo
of contraband arms to the enemy-and which could not safely be escorted
to port for adjudication as a prize of war, could be sunk after the safety of
the passengers and crew had been provided for. The rules allowed a belligerent
warship to stop a suspect merchant ship and conduct a visit and search to
determine its involvement in the enemy war effort and then, if circumstances
warranted, either capture it as a prize or take the noncombatants off board
and sink it. 6 This scenario was, of course, somewhat unrealistic if the warship
was a submarine. Surfacing to conduct visit and search procedures not only
sacrificed the submarine's main advantage of surprise attack but also made
it vulnerable to ramming even by an unarmed merchant vessel. Furthermore,
surface escort of the merchant to port for prize adjudication was obviously
dangerous for the submarine and generally interfered with its military
mission, while the alternative of sinking was made impracticable by the
inability of the already cramped submarine to provide space for the merchant
ship's crew and any passengers, and, where another suitable vessel was not
available to take these persons to port, weather and geography did not often
combine to allow them to be left safely in the ship's lifeboats.
Despite these difficulties, Germany directed its submarines to comply with
the traditional prize rules during the early part of the First World War, and
in fact German commanders made efforts to comply. However, by January,
1917, the difficulties already noted had combined with other circumstances
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to cause Germany to rescind its earlier directive and institute unrestricted
submarine warfare, including the sinking without warning of neutral
merchant ships, in a self-declared war ~one. These "other circumstances"
included a British directive to its merchant ships to disguise themselves as
neutrals and to ram submarines. Britain also apparently armed its merchant
ships and ordered them to open fire on German submarines. Thus, Germany
attempted to justify its decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare in
its war zone on the ground that it was carrying out a reprisal against these
British violations of the traditional laws of naval warfare.7
Whatever the merits of this German justification (and it probably had some
technical merit),8 German U-boat attacks on merchant vessels without prior
warning or provision for the safety of crew and passengers led not only to
United States entry into the First World War but also to widely felt
consternation over the submarine as a military weapon, consternation that
continued beyond the conclusion of the war. The naval warfare experience
of the war led to renewed proposals for the submarine's abolition in the
postwar period. To some-especially the British,joined at times by the United
States-the submarine had proved itself a horrifying offensive weapon,
generally ineffective except when used against merchant shipping in violation
of the humanitarian principles that rightly formed the core of the international
laws of war, a use for which pronounced tendencies developed, and therefore
an instrumentality of war that must be outlawed. 9 While not condoning
German behavior during the war, others contended that the submarine had
demonstrated its efficiency as a defensive weapon even when confined to
"honorable warfare" and should consequently be restricted but not
abolished. 10 In the naval conferences that followed World War I, the
abolitionists failed to achieve their goal, but the submarine, along with other
naval warships, was eventually the subject oflimitation and restriction. Thus,
article 22 of the 1930 London Naval Treaty,l1 reaffirmed in the London
Protocol of 1936,12 states:
The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules
of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned,
or of active 'resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine,
may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first
placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew
is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the
presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

The 1936 Protocol maintains this provision in effect. The United States
remains a party to the Protocol, as do the Soviet Union and over 40 other

210

Law of Naval Operations

states,13 despite the article's seeming inconsistency with the practices of
belligerents, including the United States, in the Second World War.
At the beginning of World War II, Germany again attempted to abide by
the submarine warfare rules, as then and now set forth in the London Protocol.
Again, however, this attempt was thwarted by the arming of British merchant
vessels and the practice of convoying merchant ships under the protection
of surface warships and aircraft, and the order from the British government
to its merchant ships directing them to fire on or ram submarines on the
surface. Moreover, Britain ordered its merchant vessels to provide
intelligence on the positions of any sighted submarines. In many other respects,
it can be said that the British government, by these directives and by otherwise
exercising effective wartime control over the British merchant fleet, largely
incorporated all of its merchant ships into its war-fighting efforts. Under these
circumstances, it became possible to argue that these vessels were no longer
"merchant vessels" or "merchant ships" as those terms were used in the
Protocol to describe the ships entitled to the protections there set forth. 14 In
response to the British practices, Germany soon directed its U-boats to wage
unrestricted warfare in broadening ocean zones. As in the case of Germany's
First War practices, some analysts have suggested that this Second War
response was a legitimate reprisal. 15
As World War II continued, other belligerents also adopted unrestricted
submarine warfare methods against enemy merchant ships (though most also
achieved greater success in pitting their submarines against enemy warships
than was true for the belligerents in the First World War ).16 The most
prominent example is that of the United States, which ordered unrestricted
submarine attacks against all Japanese shipping in the Pacific at the very
beginning of its involvement in the warP United States submarines in fact
waged unrestricted war against the Japanese, including the sinking of
merchant ships without warning, throughout the war. Justifications for the
U.S. departure from the traditional law of naval warfare in this respect remain
unclear. The U.S seemingly justified these attacks not on the ground of reprisal
but on the fact that Japanese merchant ships were usually armed, provided
intelligence to the Japanese military, and were otherwise integrated into
Japan's war efforts and therefore were not entitled to the protections afforded
to the "merchant ships" of the 1936 Protocol. The fact remains, however,
that unrestricted submarine warfare was ordered by the U.S. against Japan
throughout the Pacific Ocean within hours after the 7 December 1941
bombing of Pearl Harbor, before the U.S. could know whether Japan would
enlist its merchant fleet in the war effort. The initial order was fairly clearly
given in response to and in retaliation for the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and therefore carries more than a little implication of reprisal as its
justification. 1s
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Germany's submarine warfare practices in the Second World War were
the subject of the principal adjudication of the legal rules under discussion:
the trial of Admiral Karl Doenitz by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. Admiral Doenitz commanded Germany's submarine forces and
later in the war became commander of all German naval forces. He was
charged at Nuremberg with "waging unrestricted submarine warfare
contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936."19 Doenitz's counsel argued in his
behalf that German U-boat attacks on British merchantmen were justified
by the facts that these ships were armed or convoyed, provided intelligence
to the British military, and in other ways contributed to the British and Allied
war efforts. 2o While this argument can perhaps be characterized as one based
on the law of reprisal, it more clearly rests on the notion that merchant vessels
actively participating in the enemy's conduct of warfare are thereby removed
from the protections afforded to true merchantmen by the laws of naval
warfare as, in this case, embodied in the Protocol. The Nuremberg Tribunal
did indeed accept Admiral Doenitz's defense to the extent that it refused to
find that he was guilty of Protocol violations in authorizing unrestricted
submarine attacks against British merchant ships that were armed. 21 In this
respect, the Tribunal's judgment might be interpreted to mean that enemy
merchant vessels and their passengers and crews are legitimate targets of
destruction, without warning and without provision for the safety of the
people on board, if these vessels have become meaningfully integrated into
the enemy's warfighting capabilities. Critics of this broad a reading of the
Tribunal's judgment can protest that the result too heavily discounts the
humanity side of the balance that the laws of war attempt to strike between
military necessity and humanity. A more accurate analysis of the Tribunal's
ruling would perhaps emphasize the immediate threat to a submarine's safety
posed by the arming of enemy merchant ships or other real and imminent
threats to the submarine's safety that would result from the attempt to abide
by the Protocol's provisions. Cargo and passenger carriers that were armed
with weapons and the intent to engage an enemy submarine might be properly
viewed as combatant vessels and thus subject to surprise attack. On the other
hand, the mere fact that an enemy merchant vessel was assisting the enemy's
war effort in other ways would not necessarily provide justification for the
destruction of the vessel without warning if compliance with the protocol
would not expose the submarine to serious risk of harm.
The International Military Tribunal did find Doenitz guilty of violating
the Lo'ndon Protocol by declaring submarine operational areas within which
German U-boats could attack neutral merchant ships without prior warning. 22
Professor Mallison has criticized the Tribunal for failing to distinguish
between those neutral vessels that were helping the Allied cause and
consequently, in Mallison's view, were legal targets and those that were
genuinely engaged in innocent international commerce and therefore
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protected from attack.23 In any case, the Tribunal was careful to note that
it was not imposing punishment for this particular violation in its sentencing
of Admiral Doenitz because the British and the Americans had declared and
enforced similar operational zones with like risks to neutral shipping.24 Some
military analysts have suggested that the Tribunal"'s- judgment thereby
recognized the legitimacy of unrestricted submarine warfare against
merchant shipping and therefore that the London Protocol was no longer,
or never had been, binding.25 This analysis is clearly erroneous. The Tribunal
without question ruled that Doenitz had violated the Protocol. Because of
the Allied practices, however, his sentence was "not assessed on the ground
of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare," including among
these "breaches" unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral shipping.26
The clear implication is not that the Tribunal had found some sort of
customary practice changing the rules of the Protocol but that all parties had
violated these rules. The partial clemency granted Doenitz was due to its
application of a version of the "unclean hands" doctrine and not to any
recognition of the lawfulness of unrestricted commerce warfare.
The Tribunal also found Admiral Doenitz guilty of ordering his submarine
commanders to refuse to rescue survivors of their sunken targets unless "their
statements would be of importance for your boat. ''Zl Accepted rules of naval
warfare plainly imposed on warship commanders the duty to use considerable
efforts to search for and rescue survivors {including combatants),28 and
Doenitz was found guilty of violating these rules. 29 It has been pointed out
that the admiral's order was in response to an unwarranted and probably
illegal air attack on German submarines attempting to carry out their duty
to rescue survivors of a torpedoed troopship.30 It is, however, questionable
whether the law of reprisal would justify such an anti-humanitarian measure.
The Tribunal refused, on the ground of insufficient evidence, to find that
Admiral Doenitz was guilty of the more serious crimes 'of ordering German
commanders to kill survivors of U-boat attacks. 31 Helpless survivors and other
shipwrecked persons, even if enemy military crews, are not lawful objects
of attack, since they are not or are no longer combatants.32
The rescue issue is complicated again by the fact that submarines of the
world wars did not have adequate space for taking on board rescued persons.
Further, submarines surfacing for rescue operations in World War II were
vulnerable to air attack. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
in fact, received evidence that the u.S. directed its submarines in the Pacific
during that war to attempt survivor rescue only if this did not endanger the
submarines or interfere with their military missions. 33 And, because of the
limited space in the submarines, u.S. rescue efforts often consisted only of
supplying survivors with rubber rafts or provisions. 34
What can be said of the state of the law of submarine warfare as it emerged
from the experiences of the two world wars? First, it can be said that the
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submarine was a lawful weapon of war and was to be treated by the laws
of naval warfare generally like any other warship. Thus, in wartime it could
attack an enemy warship without warning and despite the stealth element
that was part of the early abolitionist reactions against this undersea weapon.
On the other hand, targets that were immune from attack by any meanshospital ships and coastal fishing vessels, for example- were also illegal
targets for submarines. Survivors and shipwrecked persons could not be killed.
The rules concerning merchant ship targets were, as already shown, more
complicated and became considerably more so as a result of the world wars.
This was true for all warships but especially for submarines because of their
unique characteristics. Developments and perceptions that came about
particularly during the Second World War added to the list of complexities
that the nature of the submarine had already created. The distinction between
merchant ships and combatants, a relatively easy one in the nineteenth
century, became confused in the big wars of the twentieth cent!lry, both
because belligerent governments armed their merchant fleets and took other
steps to integrate them into the overall warfighting effort, and because of
the new perception that entire societies, and not just their military forces,
were at war. Related to this perception was the notion that a broader range
of civilians were necessarily, even appropriately, exposed to the weapons of
war, which probably led to a dilution of the strength of the previously felt
horror at the maiming and killing of non-military crews and passengers of
targetable merchant ships. The distinction between belligerent and neutral
merchant vessels also became difficult to draw because of practices that
developed during the world wars. Warships and belligerent merchant ships
would disguise themselves as neutrals, and supposed neutrals in fact
participated in various ways in the war efforts of the belligerent states. 35 In
addition, World War II brought the real threat of air attack to add to the
vulnerability of surfaced submarines.
These practices and complications placed considerable stress on the
nineteenth-century-based rules reflected in the 1936 London Protocol and
undoubtedly induced some significant qualifications, if not outright changes,
of those rules. The major law-of-war issues raised by submarine warfare
against merchant ships were, and are, three: (1) Is a merchant ship a lawful
target for sinking? (2) If so, what, if any, provisions must be made for the
safety of crew and any passengers? (3) Is the submarine that sinks a merchant
ship required to rescue survivors? Note the dilemma posed for submarines
by each of these questions: (1) Visit and search to determine targetability
deprives the submarine of its stealth advantage and renders it vulnerable to
attack, and determination of the legitimacy of the target by other means is
often difficult or impossible. (2) Surface vulnerability and lack of space for
passengers make it dangerous and nonfeasible for submarines to provide for
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the safety of persons on board merchant vessels or (3) to effect rescue of
surVlvors.
As a result of the experiences of the two world wars, including the
subsequent trial of Admiral Doenitz, the post-World War II law of submarine
warfare against merchant ships might be summarized as follows:
As a sort of benchmark rule, it can be noted again that submarines, like
other warships, could attack enemy warships without warning. The successful
attacker, surface or submarine, was then required to search for and provide
as best as it could for the safety of survivors, although the practice of the
belligerents in World War II, especially those of the United States in the
Pacific, indicates for reasons already noted that submarines might not have
been held to as stringent a standard for survivor rescue as surface warships.
Enemy merchant ships that were armed and ordered to fight back or attack
submarines or that were convoyed under the protection of enemy warships
or aircraft were arguably not true merchants and thus could be sunk without
warning and without first providing for the safety of crew and passengers.
But rescue of survivors was required if rescue was consistent with the safety
of the submarine and its military mission.
Unarmed enemy merchant ships not under convoy protection posed a trickier
targeting situation for submarines. Because the practice of the belligerents
in World War II was, apparently, consistently to arm or convoy, a post-war
rule might be lacking because of insufficient evidence upon which to base
a rule determination. The traditional rule suggests that unprotected enemy
merchant ships in wartime could be captured by a belligerent warship without
the necessity of visit and search and escorted to port for adjudication as a
prize. The warship could probably sink the merchant vessel if the steps
required for prize adjudication would seriously endanger the warship or
interfere with its military mission-but only after the safety of the merchant's
crew and passengers had been provided for.
Following World War II, the notion of capture of eneII\Y merchant vessels
for prize adjudication seemed almost quaint and old-fashioned, especially for
submarine warships. Enemy merchantmen were apparently presumed,
because of the usual practice, to be armed or protected by enemy warships
or aircraft and thus almost automatically subject to destruction or
disablement. And belligerents tended to view, with some justification, all
enemy merchant ships, whether or not armed or convoyed, as part of the
enemy's total war effort, supporting at least the war-focused economy of the
enemy nation. In addition, capture and escort to port was often infeasible,
or judged infeasible, in the conduct of naval warfare in the world wars, again
in particular for submarines. It might therefore be said that the law of naval
warfare then allowed submarines to sink even unarmed and unprotected
enemy merchant ships without much consideration in many situations for the
alternative course of capture. The more difficult question concerns the duty,
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if any, to provide for the safety of the civilian crews and any passengers.
The International Military Tribunal gave strong indication in the Doenitz
judgment that the London Protocol's rules in this regard must be observed.
If the submarine commander found himself unable to provide for the safety
of the persons on board a merchant ship, said the Tribunal, then he "should
allow it to pass harmless before his periscope."36
It should be remembered that the 1936 London Protocol itself sets forth
two situations authorizing the destruction or incapacitation of a merchant
vessel (enemy or neutral) without the necessity of first removing passengers
and crew: "[I]n the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned,
or of active resistance to visit or search. "37 The language of the Protocol,
however, makes it clear that these are narrow exceptions; note the words
"persistent," "duly," and "active."
Even if circumstances allowed a submarine commander to sink an enemy
ship without warning-for example, where it was armed for attack on
submarines-post-war rules still undoubtedly required that the submarine
make every feasible effort to rescue survivors.
The post-war rules regarding neutral merchant vessels engaged in international
trade and not in any way assisting the enemy war effort made them immune
from attack by belligerent warships, surface or submarine. Neutral ships
suspected of carrying contraband or otherwise helping the enemy, however,
were subject to visit and search by belligerent warships. If the suspicions
turned out, upon visit and search, to have been well founded, the warship
could capture the neutral vessel as a prize of war according to traditional
rules of naval warfare. Again, however, belligerent state practices in the two
world wars blurred the lines not only between combatants and merchants
but also between neutrals and enemies, and traditional capture and prize
procedures fell somewhat out of fashion. 38 As a consequence, it might be said
that neutral merchant ships, at least where there was evidence, by visit and
search or otherwise, that they were assisting the enemy's war efforts were
in general treated like enemy merchant ships. Again, the 1936 Protocol makes
no distinction between enemy and neutral merchant ships in authorizing the
destruction or incapacitation of merchant ships in cases of "persistent" refusal
to stop when "duly" summoned or of "active" resistance to visit or search.
The most disturbing practice of belligerents in the world wars that affected
neutral shipping was the declaration of war zones or operational areas within
which, they warned, even neutral vessels were subject to destruction, without
visit and search or warning. Remember that the International Military
Tribunal condemned Admiral Doenitz for ordering this practice but refused
to impose a sentence specifically for it because of similar practices by other
belligerents in the Second War. This seeming contradiction has made it
somewhat difficult to assess the state of the post-war law concerning the
validity of using war zones as a means of rendering neutral (and enemy)
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merchant shipping vulnerable to unwarned attack by submarines.39 If a zone
was given wide publicity and its size and location would not seriously interfere
with innocent merchant shipping, would it be consistent with the
humanitarian aspects of the laws of war to allow submarine commanders to
presume that merchantmen of any flag found within the zone are legitimate
targets for attack?40 The Tribunal's judgment, read carefully, would say no,
while the practice of the belligerents in World War II would seem to say
yes. Certainly the efficiency of the submarine as a commerce raider would
be hampered by the Tribunal's answer, since compliance with the Tribunal's
strict reading of the 1936 Protocol would require the submarine commander
to choose between subjecting his boat to considerable risk and allowing a
possible, but not proved, instrument of the enemy's war effort to escape. Yet,
when stated this way, the issue seems better resolved by the Tribunal's
approach. Almost by definition, noncombatants should be entitled to greater
freedom from risk of harm than are combatants, and the Tribunal's judgment
seems to affirm this choice.

Submarines as Weapons Platforms Today41
Submarine and submarine-related developments in the 45 years since the
end of World War II have extended the list of wartime roles for underwater
weapons systems. The technological evolution has resulted in two principal
categories of u.S. submarines: attack submarines, the more-or-Iess direct
descendant of the world war submarines; and the ballistic missile submarine,
a creature of the post-war nuclear age.
Increased submerged speeds, combined with the underwater staying power
granted by nuclear propulsion, have made the attack submarine (SSN) a
warship much more capable of operating effectively against enemy fleets.
Its expanded array of weapons, complemented by long-range targeting
systems, have added to this capability by allowing the submarine to launch
sub-horizon or over-the-horizon attacks on surface ships, other submarines,
and land targets. It can, in fact, send sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs),
with conventional or nuclear warheads, far inland to strike selected targets.
And their speed, underwater duration, increased diving depth, and silenced
running have rendered today's submarines less vulnerable than their world
war counterparts to destruction by enemy warships in spite of advances in
ASW capabilities. In sum, most of the reasons that the submarines of the world
wars were relatively ineffective weapons against most targets other than
merchant ships no longer exist or are disappearing. It should be noted,
however, that the new relative invulnerability is basically due to better
abilities to escape and hide underwater. A surfaced submarine is still no match
for a surface warship-and, for that matter, probably not much of a match
for an armed merchant ship-because the modern submarine's weapons are
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apparently designed almost exclusively for underwater launching. There is
indeed no indication that the advances in submarine technology and design
assume any important combat role for a submarine on the surface. There is
no suggestion, for example, that the experiences of the two world wars have
led to submarine designs that add onboard accommodations for crews and
passengers of targeted merchant ships or deck-mounted weapons that will
give the submarine an adequate sense of security against attack while it carries
out survivor rescue operations on the surface.
The other principal category of u.s. submarines, the ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN), was of course nonexistent in the world wars. The main
role ofSSBNs is, in reality, a peacetime role: that of deterring nuclear attack
on the United States or its allies by assuring devastating retaliatory nuclear
ballistic missile attack. Nuclear powered submarines, roving undersea over
broad ocean areas, are excellent platforms for this role because it is effectively
impossible for a potential enemy to detect and destroy them, or enough of
them, as part of a first strike. The Soviet Union also deploys ballistic missile
submarines.
Although this deterrence role can continue from peacetime into wartime,
a presumable wartime role of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine is actually
to launch its nuclear-warhead missiles against enemy military targetsprincipally land-based launch sites for the enemy's strategic nuclear
weapons-and against population centers in the enemy's homeland. While
the target accuracy of submarine-launched ballistic missiles is improving, it
probably does not yet match the accuracy of strategic missiles launched from
land.
Added together, the basic naval warfare roles of both major categories of
modern underwater weapons-attack submarines and ballistic missile
submarines-currently number six, according to a recent study: (1) coast
defense; (2) attrition attacks on enemy naval forces; (3) commerce warfare;
(4) projection of power ashore; (5) engagement of enemy fleets; and (6) assured
destruction (SSBNs).42 According to the author of the study, the last three
roles came to fruition only in the 1960s, "after a long period of relative
equilibrium in submarine technology that lasted well into World War II. "43
The author also asserts that submarine developments in the near future will
probably include "a decline in the capacity to wage commerce warfare" but
increased capabilities against other warships, surface and submarine, and other
military targets. 44
In the war most contemplated by U.S. military strategists, one against the
Soviet Union, the main assignment for U.S. attack submarines, at least in
the early stages, will probably be to attempt quickly to destroy Soviet ballistic
missile submarines and also Soviet attack submarines that threaten our own
SSBNs and other naval forces. 45 If such a war were not terminated early by
strategic nuclear exchange but were to continue with conventional weapons
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and possibly tactical or intermediate-range nuclear weapons, other roles for
attack submarines would be likely to emerge. These would certainly
include coastal defense, projection of force ashore against military targets,
and operations against the enemy's surface fleet. 46 The submarine role that
presented the most troublesome legal issues in the two world wars-that of
commerce raider-will probably not be nearly as significant in the future,
at least in the contemplated war with the Soviet Union. 47 For one thing,
NATO forces will probably be much more dependent on merchant shipping
than the opposing forces, which suggests the possibility that Soviet attack
submarines could be assigned a major anti-commerce role in such a protracted
war.4B For a complex of other reasons, however, submarines will be much
less effective as commerce warfare weapons in the foreseeable future. 49 To
the extent that submarines of either side are given missions to attack merchant
shipping, the experience of World War II can lead us to expect that
merchantmen targets will be armed and convoyed and otherwise protected
by highly sophisticated ASW technology and techniques, including aircraft
and attack submarines of the protecting forces.
As the 1982 United Kingdom-Argentina war for the Falklands has
demonstrated, exclusion zones or war zones are a likely part of any future
war, perhaps especially a limited war.50 The prominent practice by the world
war belligerents of declaring war zones suggests that these will also be a
component of any future global war-at least a protracted world-wide war
fought with conventional weapons. Although the purposes of declaring such
zones in wartime can be several, an apparently intended effect of the zones
for the warships, including submarines, of the declaring belligerent party is
to shift or ease the burden of proof under the rules of engagement. In the
absence of the zone, or outside it, the warship commander bears the heavy
burden of establishing the legitimacy of his contemplated target, while the
terms of the zone declaration usually purport to allow him to more readily
presume targetability. As already noted, the Nuremberg Tribunal refused to
condone the practice of declaring a war zone insofar as its effect was to relieve
the burden of complying with the laws of naval warfare protecting neutral
shipping. The Falklands War showed, however, that a war zone may also
have as its purpose, or one of its purposes, the shifting of the burden of
identifying a proper target and showing imminently hostile intent of another
state's warship or aircraft. 51 Thus the controversial sinking of the Argentine
cruiser, the General Belgrano, by a U.K. submarine outside the British-declared
exclusion zone 52 was not necessarily illegal, though the submarine
commander's burden of showing hostile intent was the normally heavy one.
Whether the declaration of a war zone is a lawful means of shifting the burden
remains an open question. Still, it can be assumed that future belligerents will
engage in the zone-declaring practice and that the terms of the zones will
affect the engagement decisions of their submarine commanders.
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The Current State of the Law of Submarine Warfare
It has been said that the laws of warfare attempt to achieve proper balance
between military necessity and humanity. 53 This approach generally translates
into, inter alia, rules designed to protect noncombatants-civilians, prisoners
of war, survivors of attacks on ships, and so on-and restrictions against
excessive force and inhumane weapons. Difficult legal questions surround
decisions on whether or to what extent it is permissible to inflict civilian
casualties in attacks on military targets. It is perhaps ironic that the humanity
side of the military necessity/humanity formula was considerably degraded
in the very war that gave rise to the still-current and widespread declaration
of support for individual human rights and freedoms. 54 In World War II,
civilian populations in enemy cities became legitimate targets for aerial
bombardment, at least in reprisal or as "incidental" casualties of targeting
military installations. And, as we have seen, noncombatant crews and
passengers of merchant ships, even neutral ships, became acceptable victims
of submarines' torpedoes. The habit of justifying the killing and maiming of
civilians in wartime, for example, by reason of the circumstance that they
happened to be in the vicinity of almost any military target has, to some
extent, continued from World War II to present times, even in limited wars
where the objective is not national survival. The idea that entire societies
participate in the militaristic schemes of their political and military leaders,
another Second World War notion, has also undoubtedly made it possible
for today's military planners to contemplate the intended destruction of an
enemy's population centers. To some, apparently, almost any characterization
of military necessity rationalizes the disregard or discounting of any humanity
considerations. This is an unfortunate twentieth-century trend. It is
understandable that military commanders will in general prefer a broader
rather than narrower range of legitimacy for their actions and the easing of
the tremendous burden that often comes with engagement decisions where
humanitarian and military considerations intermingle. Decision dilemmas are,
however, the essence of command, and military officers necessarily bear the
brunt of these terrible dilemmas of their national governments.
The government of the United States has, especially in the years since the
Second World War, consistently placed itself in the forefront of those
governments promoting humanitarian values and the rights and freedoms of
individuals everywhere. Most governments of the international community
subscribe to these values (by words if somewhat haphazardly by deeds),55 and
these are essentially the same values that account for the humanity side of
the laws of war formulations. Can it be said, therefore, that the international
community, led by the U.S and others, has implicitly indicated that
humanitarian factors are now entitled to renewed weight in the military
decision process despite the degradation of these factors in the world wars?
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Or have the modern warfighting conditions and perceptions that developed
during those wars continued to affect military decisions that might put
civilians at risk?
These are questions that raise important matters, the full analysis of which
is beyond the scope of this chapter but which are nevertheless central to the
discussion of at least some of the issues in this part of the chapter: the present
state of the law of submarine warfare. All belligerents in World War II
justified in some manner surprise submarine attacks on merchant ships without
the necessity of providing for the safety of crews and passengers who were
not formally part of the armed forces of an enemy. To what extent these
practices are justified under current law will be one of the questions discussed
in the following paragraphs. Other issues will include the legality of
submarines as such, other targets of submarines and their modern weapons,
the lawfulness of their weaponry itself, and the effects of declaring operational
areas or exclusion zones. This section will then set forth a brief note on
submerged navigation under current law. It will also refer, where
appropriate, to three distinctions that the previous discussions have alluded
to: between belligerent and neutral vessels; between combatant and merchant
ships; and between general (but conventionally fought) wars and limited wars.
Are submarines legal? This question, one that concerned delegations to
conferences on the laws of war earlier in the century, can now be answered.
Like other warships, submarines are legal weapons but, like other warships,
are subject to some restrictions. 56 The best evidence for their legality is the
Nuremberg Tribunal's judgment in the case of Admiral Doenitz where the
Tribunal necessarily assumed the basic legality of submarines, while
condemning certain uses of them in wartime.57
Targeting other warships. As a basic proposition, enemy warships found
outside neutral waters are legitimate targets for a belligerent warship,
including a submarine, and can lawfully be attacked by the latter without
either warning or precautions for the safety of the combatant crew members.58
It is not among the purposes of this chapter to examine the problems for this
rule caused by the practice in recent decades of entering into hostilities
without formal declarations of war, declarations that formerly assisted
considerably the process of deciding who is the "enemy." Once that decision
has been made, by whatever process, "warships" ought to mean those clearly
designated as such by their weaponry, their operation by uniformed members
of an enemy's armed forces, and their required markings.
The conduct of warfare in the post-World War II years, however, has
called into question even the basic proposition, thus defined. There has not
been a global war, with national survival as an objective, since the Second
World War. Limited war has been the recent war fighting experience. This
has usually meant limited in objective or geographical scope or both. 59 For
example, the belligerents in the war for the Falklands expressly and implicitly
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limited both the objectives and the geographical scope of their conflict. Each
state seemed to concede that an attack on one of the other's warships outside
the zone of conflict was not permissible in the absence of factors giving rise
to the right of self defense, such as an initial attack or other indication of
imminent hostile intent on the part of the enemy's warship. Moreover, the
negative international community reaction to the sinking of the General
Belgrano, an Argentine warship, outside the United Kingdom's self-declared
exclusion zone seemingly supported this legal effect of limiting hostilities. 6O
This reaction can probably be attributed in part not only to the geographical
limitation inherent in the nature of the war, as well as in the U.K. 's
declaration, but in the perception of disproportion between the U.K.'s
military objective-the retaking of the islands-and the loss to Argentina368lives. 61 It is also possible that the negative reaction is attributable in part
to the fact that the Belgrano was sunk in a stealthy surprise attack by a
submarine rather than in open combat with a U.K. surface ship.
The practices of belligerent states in the limited wars of this half-century
provide indications, therefore, that enemy warships are not always and
everywhere lawful targets for a belligerent's surface warships or its
submarines. Formulators of rules of engagement for limited hostilities should
give consideration to restrictions arising from geographical scope and
proportionality to the military objective or objectives. The practices of
belligerents in a war fought on a global scale and with national survival among
the objectives are not necessarily appropriate precedents for the laws of naval
warfare in a limited war.
Only in such a global war, therefore, might it be said without qualification
that enemy warships in non-neutral waters are open, unrestricted targets for
submarines (or other belligerent warships). But where circumstances allow
submarine attack on an enemy warship, the submarine commander can pursue
his attack without warning and without first providing for the safety of the
target's crew. For example, shortly after the commencement of a war
between the United States and the Soviet Union (something fortunately not
likely at the present stage of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and, it is hoped,
something that will never occur), American submarines will be able lawfully
to carry out their presumed ASW and anti-surface-fleet roles through surprise
attacks.
But what of survivors of submarine attacks on enemy warships? The
implication (somewhat confused) of the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal in the Doenitz case would require submarine commanders
to make substantial efforts to search for and rescue the survivors of the ships
they have sunk, at least if such efforts would not expose rescuing submariners
to undue danger. Even in World War II it was risky and often impracticable
for submarines (as contrasted to larger and more heavily armed surface ships)
to effect rescue of survivors, although evidence presented to the Tribunal
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indicated that some efforts were made. Presumably, over-the-horizon
targeting today makes it both less practicable and more dangerous for
submarines to attempt to rescue survivors of their attacks: the sinking is more
likely to occur at some distance from the position of the attacking submarine
and the surfaced submarine engaged in rescue would itself be vulnerable to
surprise (even if unlawful) attack. Another consideration should be an
assessment of the enemy's capabilities to effect rescue of its own people.
The best that can be said for the current rule on the obligation to rescue
survivors is that such an obligation still exists, with new circumstances
qualifying-and, especially in the case of submarines, probably effectively
reducing-the extent of the duty. In situations where it is feasible and not
unreasonably dangerous to rescue, either by taking survivors on board the
submarine or other vessel or by supplying them with life rafts and provisions
(in accordance with u.s. precedent in the Pacific in World War II), the
current law of submarine warfare probably requires that these steps be taken.
Targeting merchant ships. This, of course, presented the major legal issue
concerning the use of submarines in the two world wars. As stated above,
the law of submarine warfare after the Second World War remained based
on the London Protocol of 1936, but with some practical qualifications
attributable to nontraditional practices of the belligerents in their conduct
of that war. These practices, it 'will be recalled, resulted in the blurring of
distinctions between merchant ships and warships, between neutral merchant
ships and enemy merchant ships, and, in general, between combatants and
noncombatants. It must be noted, though, that these practices were in large
measure a consequence of the correct perception by each belligerent state
that it was engaged in a global-scale war and fighting for its national survival.
Thus all segments of a belligerent's society were in some manner engaged
in the fighting, including its merchant fleet and, where it could enlist or
intimidate them, the merchant fleets of technically neutral states. While we
can expect the same to be true for the belligerents in any future general war
of similar or greater magnitude, it will not necessarily be true for the wars
of lesser scale that have constituted the belligerency experiences since the
Second World War.
What, then, can be said for the current state of the law of submarine
warfare regarding the targeting of merchant vessels? In general, submarines
are undoubtedly subject to the same rules as surface warships in this regard.
The practices of World War II suggest that in a war on a global scale with
national survival of the belligerents at stake, it is permissible for belligerent
warships to capture or, where capture is not feasible, to sink enemy merchant
vessels on the assumption, in such a war, that these vessels are part of the
enemy's warfighting efforts. This is probably the rule for general war today
(assuming it would proceed for a time without resort to strategic nuclear
weapons). It is by no means clear, however, that this is the rule for today's
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popular limited wars. Outside the area of any legitimate blockade or legal
exclusion area, visit and search should be the rule for unarmed and
unconvoyed enemy merchant ships. If visit and search discloses that an enemy
merchant vessel is then and there supporting the enemy's conduct of the
limited war, it is subject to capture or, where appropriate, sinking or
incapacitation. As a basic proposition, a neutral merchant ship must, according
to the International Military Tribunal, be visited and searched to determine
its susceptibility to capture or sinking even in a general war and even in a
declared war zone. This should certainly be the rule for neutral shipping in
a limited war. (Whether the declaration of an exclusion zone or other war
zone affects the operation of this rule is an issue addressed below.)
In any case, because of the risk that perceived mistreatment of neutral
vessels might lead neutral states to enter the conflict on the other side,
belligerents can probably be expected to treat neutrals with better regard
than that accorded to enemy merchant ships.
The status of merchant crews and passengers is of course the critical
consideration. It should be recalled that the London Protocol of 1936 is
technically still in force for nearly 50 States, including the United States and
the Soviet Union. These States are thus arguably bound by the terms of the
Protocol to provide for the safety of the crew and any passengers of a merchant
ship (enemy or neutral) prior to its destruction or incapacitation unless the
merchant either persistently refuses to stop after being duly summoned or
actively resists visit or search. Both the Doenitz judgment and the practices
of belligerents in World War II, however, stand for the proposition that the
enemy's armed or convoyed merchant ships are lawful targets of surprise
submarine attacks without the necessity of visit and search or provision for
the safety of the crew and passengers. This is probably still the case under
the current law of submarine warfare, at least in a general (but conventional)
war, because such merchantmen are effectively part of the enemy's
warfighting force. In a limited war with limited objectives, on the other hand,
humanitarian principles and proportionality should require a determination
by the submarine commander that even an armed or convoyed merchant ship
found outside the war's geographical area is, then and there, actively and
significantly a part of the enemy's pursuit of that war as a prerequisite to
the merchant's destruction without warning.
Publicists who have previously analyzed the rules of submarine warfare
have frequently noted the "unreality" of a requirement that submarines, as
contrasted to surface warships, provide for the safety of merchant ship crews
and passengers under virtually any circumstances. 62 There is no question but
that submarines, even today's relatively larger ones, have little space for
taking these people on board and remain vulnerable while on the surface in
an attempt to comply with the obligation. To this suggestion that submarines
should therefore be exempt from the rule, the International Military Tribunal
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provided a response in the Doenitz judgment: Comply or allow the merchant
vessel to pass unharmed. The humanitarian principles that prompted this
response should be no less applicable today, particularly in the case of a limited
war.
The comparatively restricted capability of submarines for protecting the
crews and passengers of merchant ship targets also affects their responsibility
to search for and rescue the survivors of their attacks on merchant ships.
Nevertheless, the duty to rescue survivors, one of the clearest obligations in
the rules of naval warfare, undoubtedly applies to an even greater degree
for merchant ship survivors, and submarine commanders should be expected
to do everything in their power to comply with this responsibility.
Any submarine commander reading the above complex of rules,
qualifications and exceptions will probably raise a legitimate and crucial
question. He might well ask what he should or can do in case of doubt. What
if, for example, he cannot determine whether an enemy merchant ship is
armed or not? How can he tell whether a convoyed merchant ship is actively
and significantly contributing to the enemy's conduct of the limited war
between the belligerents, and what does he do if he suspects it is but cannot
know for sure? It is common for law to provide presumptions for doubtful
cases. In this case, especially for commanders of the United States military,
the presumption should be clear. Any state that strongly defends and promotes
humanitarian values, as does the U.S., should nearly always erase such doubts
in favor of the humanity side of the military necessity/humanity formula for
laws of war. The apparent fact that the presumption often went the other
way, even for the U.S., in the last world war does not necessarily mean that
it should do likewise in a future limited war or, for that matter, a conventional
general war. (Besides, a rule giving broad protection for merchant ships
against unwarned submarine attack is in the greater interest of the United
States in a future war with the Soviet Union since, as already noted, the
potential merchant targets will most often be assisting NATO forces.) Where
belligerents perceive that their national survival is at stake, however, their
practices will undoubtedly vary from the letter of many rules of warfare,
including those under consideration.
The question concerning presumptions in cases of doubt raises another issue
related to the targetability of merchant ships, especially neutral ships, and
the responsibility for the safety of their crews and passengers. This issue is
the validity of self-declared war zones or exclusion zones, a topic that will
now be addressed prior to proceeding to consideration of other potential
targets of submarine weapons.
Exclusion zones. Despite the International Military Tribunal's
condemnation of Admiral Doenitz's declaration of unrestricted submarine
warfare in operational areas or war zones, it seems clear that such zones were
in World War II and continue to be established components of warfighting
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practices at sea. One analyst has proposed reVlSlons of the 1936 London
Protocol that would include the following provision on exclusion zones:
Within clearly announced and defined war zones, limited by a line extending 200 miles
outside the coastline of a belligerent state, 200 miles outside the coastline of an area
where land hostilities are in progress, or 200 miles outside the coastline of any territory
occupied by a belligerent state, all vessels, belligerent or neutral, excepting marked
hospital ships and coastal fishing vessels, are subject to sinking upon sight .
. . . If a declared war zone blocks ingress to and egress from neutral territory, the
belligerent declaring the zone must, upon request, provide a means of safe passage
through the war zone for neutral vessels calling at and leaving the blocked neutral
territory.63

While it is true that an effect of declaring such a war zone or exclusion zone
might very well be to warn neutral shipping away from dangerous sea areas,
this is certainly not the principal reason for the zone. A clear purpose of such
a zone, perhaps its main purpose, is to relieve the burden on warship
commanders in a hot war area to take the difficult and often dangerous steps
otherwise required to determine the legitimacy of firing on vessels of doubtful
status. 64 The current popularity of exclusion zones is evidenced by their use
by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf65 and by the United
Kingdom in the 1982 war for the Falkland Islands. The U.K. 's use of exclusion
zones in the latter war is especially relevant to the present discussion because
it may be the only limited war since World War II in which the submarine
has played a significant role. 66 However, in that case, the declaration of an
exclusion zone in at least one respect operated against the interests of the
declaring belligerent state by giving the impression (falsely) that no attacks
would be carried out by the British outside the zone, thereby contributing
to the negative reaction to the torpedoing of the General Belgrano just beyond
the zone's outer limits.
Nevertheless, exclusion zones are indeed popular and, moreover, are
apparently part of U.S. naval war plans. 67 If they are legal, they are especially
valuable for submarine commanders, who have the greatest difficulty in
determining targetability without sacrificing their advantage of stealth and
subjecting themselves to the dangers of the sea's surface. Are exclusion zones
legal? This unfortunately remains an unanswered question. Their popularity
suggests that precedent is building in their favor. Yet it should be recalled
that one of the principal purposes of declaring an exclusion zone is, in law
of war terms, to shift the presumption in favor of military necessity and away
from humanitarian considerations-at least to the extent that shifting the
presumption in doubtful cases more often places civilian crews and passengers
at risk of death and injury in exchange for lessening the risk to warship crews.
No state that places real value in the recognition of humanitarian principles
should lightly promote or easily accept a significant shift in this direction.
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Exclusion zones, if they continue to be used by belligerents, should either
be limited (usually in limited war situations) in placement and scale so as not
greatly to inconvenience genuinely neutral shipping or include reasonable
provision for safe passage for neutral vessels. As the war in the Persian Gulf
clearly demonstrated, it is not in the interest of the United States or other
seafaring nations to tolerate the use by belligerents of exclusion zones or other
practices that unduly interfere with freedom of the seas for neutral traffic
or to abide the seriously heightened risk of harm to noncombatants that can
accompany the enforcement of these claimed war zones.
Other targets of submarines. There is no suggestion in current trends that
hospital ships, clearly marked as such and not otherwise in violation of the
relevant rules for hospital status, have lost any of their traditional immunity
from attack by belligerent warships, including submarines. 68 Coastal fishing
vessels that are unarmed and not otherwise assisting an enemy's war effort
are probably still similarly immune.69
As noted above, the expanded roles for today's more capable and versatile
submarine weapons systems include attacks against objectives on land. In
general, the lawfulness of strikes against land targets is the same whether
the attacks are launched from surface warships, land-based weapons systems,
aircraft, or submarines. Consequently, the legality of projection of force
ashore by submarines will not be discussed in detail in the present chapter.
If the land target is a legitimate one, a submarine bombardment will, in the
main, be as lawful as any other attack-and, of course, the converse is true.
Particular weapons in the modem submarine's arsenal and the targeting
systems employed in their use, however, have been the subject of some
concern and discussion, often whether the target is at sea or on land. These
weapons problems are analyzed in the next section.
Submarine weaponry. The laws of war include rules designed to prohibit
the employment of weapons in such a manner as to cause excessive suffering
or disproportionate risk of harm to noncombatants. Thus self-propelled
torpedoes, the principal weapons of submarines in the two world wars, must
disarm if they miss their targets,70 and the rules concerning the laying of
stationary mines forbid their use in areas or manners that unduly endanger
commercial shipping. 71 Like other platforms that use these weapons,
submarines must comply with the laws of war that govern them.
The legality of the tactical use of sea launched cruise missiles in naval
warfare, especially those launched from'submerged submarines, has been the
subject of some debate. Challengers to the legality of these weapons have
emphasized the risks posed to merchant ships, both neutral and protected
belligerent vessels, by imperfect target identification and acquisition
systems. 72 As one of those urging the outlawing of submarine launched cruise
missiles asserted in 1977:
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The primary danger is that the missiles will fix on a ship other than the intended target.
The threat is increased when the missile is subjected to electronic countermeasures
(ECM) and other diversionary tactics employed by the target. A similar increase in threat
level arises primarily from inherent design shortcomings, which at present are thought
to be great. 73

The same writer suggested that underwater launching, using sonar detection,
would heighten the chance for error.74 Basically, the argument against the
legality of the weapon focused on the disproportionality of the risk of harm
to noncombatants, particularly in crowded sea lanes, compared to the military
necessity of striking at the intended combatant target. A response to this
position, also in 1977, contended that the proportionality of the risk to
noncombatants could be controlled by rules of engagement cautioning against
the use of submarine launched cruise missiles where the risk was too great. 75
This is probably an appropriate approach. Moreover, the problem should
decrease in significance with (presumed) increase in the accuracy and
dependability of the targeting systems.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the lawfulness of nuclear
weapons as such, as that topic is the subject of a separate chapter in the present
volume as well as much intense discussion elsewhere.76 Ballistic missile
submarines provide, of course, one important type of launch platform for
strategic nuclear weapons, and attack submarines are capable of launching
nuclear strikes against targets at sea or on land. It can be said generally that
if the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons is illegal, it is illegal for
submarines to launch them or to threaten to launch them. If, on the other
hand, they are legal-even though, as in the case of other weapons, their
use is restricted-then submarines can use them-within the bounds of the
restrictions.
Claims of illegality of nuclear weapons rely on the proposition that they
are either intended for use against noncombatant civilian populations or that
their awesome destructive power, combined with their radiation effects,
means that their use, even against military objectives, necessarily entails
disproportionate harm to noncombatants and excessive human suffering.
These claims can be met in part by improvements in the accuracy of targeting
systems that would minimize the risk to civilians where the target is a military
objective. To the extent that subsea launches of nuclear missiles rely on
targeting systems that are less accurate than those of air- or land-based
platforms, the asserted legality problem is a larger one for submarines than
for other platforms. The indications are that the accuracy of submarine
systems is improving. If so, the legality issue may be essentially the same for
all launch systems. Of course, the question of whether it is lawful to target
civilian population centers as a deterrent measure or actually to launch strikes
intentionally at these targets in wartime is the same for submarines as it is
for land or air systems.
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A Note on Submerged Navigation. On the high seas and within exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), submerged navigation is a freedom of the high seas.n
Although traditional law of the sea rules require submarines to navigate on
the surface and show their flags as part of their innocent passage
responsibilities in foreign coastal state territorial seas,78 the United States takes
the position that customary law of the sea allows submerged transit through
straits used for international navigation, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, even
if these straits are blanketed by up-to-twelve-mile territorial seas. Consistent
with this position, the U.S. contends that the straits transit passage provisions
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-a treaty the
U.S. has so far rejected in no uncertain terms because ofits deep seabed mining
rules-are merely reflections or articulations of custom.79 Most nations
probably disagree, asserting that the straits passage provisions of the 1982
Convention are not reflective of custom but are treaty law exceptions to the
general rule of surface passage, negotiated by the U.S. in the Third World
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in exchange for, among other things,
the deep seabed mining regime that the U.S. now finds unacceptable. so And
because treaties bind and benefit only the parties to them, say these States,
the U.S. will not have the right of submerged straits transit unless it becomes
a party to the 1982 treaty. These States have a good case.
This controversy could be significant for U.S. submarines in wartime.
While submerged passage or transit through the territorial seas of belligerents
is no doubt lawful in wartime, submarines will be required to obey the general
law of the sea restrictions in territorial seas of neutrals. Whatever the true
state of the law on this subject, it would certainly be wise for the United
States in any wartime situation, especially a limited war, to take the wishes
of significant neutral States into consideration and consult with them before
transiting their territorial seas in submerged modes.
The concept of "archipelagic waters," recognized as such for the first time
in the 1982 Convention,81 presents a somewhat more complex, but at the same
time less controversial, issue. The treaty in general allows States composed
completely of archipelagoes (island groups), such as Indonesia and the
Philippines, to enclose their islands and the waters between them by a series
of straight baselines, but also provides for these States to establish sea lanes
through their thus-created archipelagic waters for international traffic,
including submerged passage by submarines.82 The United States, though
rejecting the 1982 treaty, expresses a willingness to recognize the
establishment of archipelagic waters in accordance with the treaty's rules. 83
Again, in wartime the issue would arise only with respect to the rights of
neutral archipelagic States. In fact, current law of the sea, in the absence
of the 1982 treaty (which is as yet not in force for any State), probably does
not recognize the concept of archipelagic waters at all and would thus allow
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any high seas areas between the islands of an

The New Commander's Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations
The new Handbook (NWP 9)84 appears to be a basically sound, readable
guide for naval commanders. The discussion of the Handbook in the present
chapter will be limited to the topics addressed in the preceding section of
the chapter on the current state of the law of submarine warfare and will
be treated in the same order. The purpose of the discussion is, of course, to
assess the handbook's consistency or lack of consistency with the suggested
current state of the law.
Are submarines legal? The Handbook does not mention this question and
properly so. It is today a non-issue. Submarines as such are now clearly lawful
weapons of war and the Handbook, by the implication of its omission,
recognizes this conclusion.
Targeting other warships. The Handbook states that "[ e Jnemy
warships ... , including naval and military auxiliaries, are subject to attack,
destruction, or capture anywhere beyond neutral territory. "85 It goes on to
state that "[sJubmarines may employ their conventional weapons systems to
attack, capture, or destroy enemy surface targets wherever located beyond
neutral territory," and that ~'[ eJnemy warships and naval auxiliaries may be
attacked and destroyed without warning. "86 It was suggested above, however,
that the allowance reflected in the latter quotation, if taken literally, might
not be consistent with the present law of limited war. Even enemy warships,
if not directly supporting the enemy's fighting of a limited war and if found
outside the area of hot water, especially a war with limited objectives, might
not be lawful objects of unrestricted attack in the absence of grounds for self
defense. Certainly, the rule stated in the Handbook is appropriate for the global
wars of this century, but not all of those rules would necessarily be appropriate
or applicable to wars limited in geographical scope and in objectives falling
short of a fight for national survival. It is by no means clear, for example,
that the international community would have viewed it as lawful for an
Argentine submarine to have attacked without direct provocation a British
warship on a routine mission thousands of miles from the Falklands during
the course of the limited war over possession of those islands. Perceptions
of military necessity and proportionality in limited war may demand restraints
on the use of force not called for in a world war.
The Handbook clearly states the obligation of our naval forces to search
for and rescue the survivors of their attacks on enemy warships, in accordance
with U.S. duties under the 1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
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Forces at Sea. 87 This obligation is to be carried out "consistent with the
security of their forces,"88 a phrase that could be interpreted to have special
meaning for submarine commanders, since their boats are particularly
vulnerable while attempting to effect rescue on the surface. Consistent with
this suggestion, the Handbook proposes the following qualification of the
obligation for submarines:
To the extent that military exigencies permit, submarines are also required to search
for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick following an engagement. If such
humanitarian efforts would subject the submarine to undue additional hazard or prevent
it from accomplishing its military mission, the location of possible survivors should be
passed at the first opportunity to a surface ship, aircraft, or shore facility capable of
rendering assistance. 89

The only troublesome aspect of this interpretation is its lack of a direction
to assess the proportionality of the importance of the "military exigency"
or the "military mission" that will, according to the statement, authorize
the departure from the general humanitarian rule of rescue. Clearly, not all
military missions are so necessary or imperative that they cannot be eliminated
or postponed in order to carry out the important humanitarian duty to rescue
survivors. It would be better if the Handbook tied its special regard for
submarines more closely to the safety of the submarine and its crew under
the circumstances rather than the continuance of its military mission.
Of course, the Handbook strongly admonishes commanders against the
killing, wounding or mistreating of survivors and the shipwrecked, treating
them as noncombatants,90 and in fact correctly reminds its readers that these
are major war crimes. 91
Targeting merchant vessels. This has been the principal issue in the law
of submarine warfare. Whether it is today a major issue, in light of the
expanded wartime roles for u.s. submarines, is in question. By most
assessments, it will remain a significant issue for Soviet submarines.92
In general, the authors of the Commander}s Handbook have done an excellent
job of restating the complex and often confusing state of the law on this
difficult topic. Contrary to the view of some publicists, but consistent with
the approach of this chapter, the Handbook considers the 1936 London Protocol
as continuing to bind the parties to it, including the U.S., but suggests that
the conduct of the Second World War (and unspecified practices following
that war) have led to some modifications of the Protocol in its application
to submarine warfare today.
According to the Handbook, "[ t ]he conventional rules of naval warfare
pertaining to submarine operations against enemy merchant shipping
constitute one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict. "93
Unfortunately, the Handbook itself contributes a bit of confusion to this already
perplexing subject. In addressing the issue of targeting enemy merchant ships,
it purports to excuse submarines from the constraints imposed on belligerent
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surface warships because of "impracticality,"94 but does not make clear what
exactly are the constraints that submarines are excused from. By comparing
the book's designated section on submarine warfare with other provisions on
surface warfare, one is led to assume that submarines are not required to make
the efforts required of surface warships to determine enemy character or to
capture enemy merchantmen as prizes, but this assumption is by no means
obvious. The modifications to the London Protocol that the Handbook discovers
in the "customary practice of belligerents during and following W orId War
II" seem to be just about the same for surface warships as for submarines.95
For submarines, the book states that the general rule, based on the Protocol,
imposes on submarines the duty to provide for the safety of an enemy merchant
ship's passengers, crew and papers prior to destruction. The Protocol and the
asserted subsequent practice, however, are said to provide four exceptions
to this general rule.
The first exception occurs where the enemy merchant ship "refuses to stop
when summoned to do so or otherwise resists capture. "96 The Protocol itself
would require for its similar exception "persistent refusal to stop upon being
duly summoned" or "active resistance to visit or search."97 It is unclear why
the authors of the Handbook would omit the emphasized qualifiers, except
perhaps in the interest of saving space. The modifying adjectives and adverb,
though themselves not capable of precise definition, are important for their
communication of the narrowness of the exception and should not be omitted.
As it stands, the Handbook}s statement of the exception seems to authorize
destruction of a merchant ship without providing for the safety of its crew
and passengers in circumstances, not unlikely to occur in wartime, where an
initial warning, perhaps a confusing unorthodox order, from a submarine is
met at first by an instinctive, half-hearted resistance. There appears to be
no reason in post-1936 practice to lessen the stringency of this exception to
the general rule of saving the civilian crews and passengers.
The second exception to this general rule set forth by the Handbook occurs
when an enemy merchant ship "is sailing under armed convoy or is itself
armed. "98 The practice of the W orId War II belligerents and the International
Military Tribunal's judgment in the Doenitz case do indicate that this is indeed
now an exception to the Protocol's general rule regarding the safety of
passengers and crew and would further allow surprise attack on enemy
merchant vessels so convoyed or armed- at least in a general war. Limited
warfare may require limitations of location and proportionality in favor of
the humanitarian principles supporting the general rule. It should be noted
again that, even where it applies, this "exception" is not necessarily a real
exception. It could just as well be a legitimate interpretation of the literal
words of the London Protocol: an enemy merchant ship armed or convoyed
against submarines might be considered for this context an enemy warship
and no longer a "merchant ship" protected by the terms of the Protocol.
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The Handbook's third exception to the Protocol's general rule occurs when
the enemy merchant ship "is assisting in any way the enemy's military
intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary to the
enemy's armed forces."99 At first glance, this exception might appear to be
simply a corollary of or variation on the second exception regarding armed
or convoyed enemy merchantmen. But there is, or can often be, an important
distinction between the two. A merchant ship armed against submarines is
not only part of the enemy's fighting force but actively intends to fight
submarines and, because of the submarine's vulnerability on the surface, is
capable of successfully doing so. Such a merchantman is purposely prepared
to prevent the submarine from carrying out the responsibilities that the
Protocol otherwise requires. On the other hand, an enemy merchant ship that
is "in any way" assisting the enemy's intelligence (as contrasted to, for
example, calling in an air or over-the-horizon attack on the submarine) does
not necessarily pose a threat of imminent harm to a surfaced submarine. The
important humanitarian concerns reflected in the Protocol should not be
sacrificed in order to avoid minor risks to the submarine, even if it can be
established that the merchant is or has been providing intelligence in some
manner not immediately threatening the safety of the submarine. And, again,
this should be especially true in a limited war with limited objectives, in which
proportionality considerations should allow greater relative weight for the
humanity side of the balance between military necessity and humanity.
Finally, the Handbook would allow deviation from the Protocol's general
rule where
[t]he enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its war-fighting/war-sustaining
effort and compliance with this rule would, under the circumstances of the specific
encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude
mission accomplishment.I OO

There is much to be said for the proposition that the practices of World War
II belligerents provide substantial precedent for this exception, particularly

for any future general war, the sort of war in which i belligerent does
integrate all assets within its control into its war efforts. In this sense, the
rule exception implicitly recognizes a pertinent and valuable distinction
between general war and limited war. Again, however, the last clause
concerning preclusion of mission should perhaps be modified by requiring a
proportionality consideration.
Despite the World War II claims threatening unwarned attacks on neutral
shipping in broad war zones, the Handbook's rules are generally protective
of neutral merchant ships. Neutrals that have not taken on enemy characterin which case they are to be treated either as enemy warships or enemy
merchant ships, depending on the nature of their support for the enemy_IOI
can be captured as prizes, but only after visit and search to establish their
susceptibility to capture. Moreover, captured neutral vessels can be sunk only
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after every reasonable effort has been made to avoid their destruction and
only after the capturing officer is "entirely satisfied that the prize can neither
be sent into a belligerent port ... nor, in his opinion, properly released. "102
In any case where destruction of a neutral ship is ordered, the capturing officer
must provide for the safety of the ship's passengers and crew .103 The Handbook's
discussion of treatment of neutral ships makes no distinction between the
obligations owed by surface warships and those owed by submarines. It could
be said, therefore, that in some respects the Handbook provides more protection
for neutral shipping:-in a general war, at any rate- than the current law
of submarine warfare provides.
'
The Handbook's statement of the law of naval warfare on the rescue of
survivors of attack, discussed above, applies equally to survivors of attacks
on merchant ships and attacks on enemy warships. Although a reasonable
argument can be made for requiring even greater efforts in the case of
merchant ship survivors, this is probably an accurate statement of the current
rule.
Exclusion zones. As noted, the lawfulness of unilaterally declared war
zones or exclusion zones or areas of operation is debatable. Such zones were
used in both world wars in part to claim justification for surprise submarine
attacks on merchant shipping, including neutral shipping, found within the
zones. The Nuremberg Tribunal clearly ruled that such zones did not provide
the right of a belligerent, even in the all-out war with which it was concerned,
to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral merchant ships.
Perhaps in partial consequence, the Handbook takes a careful approach to the
subject. In its discussion of the law of blockade, the Handbook notes attempts
by belligerents in both world wars to assert "so-called long-distance
blockades" that were not in conformity with the law of naval warfare
allowing close-in blockade but which were justified, says the Handbook, upon
the right of reprisal. Whatever the asserted justification (and, as pointed out
above, reprisal was not the only one), these "blockades" supposedly often
authorized unannounced submarine attacks on neutral shipping in the declared
areas. While the Handbook correctly describes the difficulty, especially in
current times and in a general war, to impose an effective close-in blockade,
it nevertheless does not endorse the legitimacy of the extended blockades of
the world wars.1 04
Yet the Handbook does assert the validity of zones or operational areas
"[w]ithin the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations" where a
belligerent may impose "special restrictions" on neutral traffic, including
prohibition from entering the areas. lOS The belligerent cannot, however,
"purport to deny access to neutral nations, or to close an international strait
to neutral shipping, pursuant to this authority unless another route of similar
convenience remains open to neutral traffic. "106 Although the Handbook rules
state that a neutral merchant ship is liable to capture for, among other
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activities, violating the regulations established by the belligerent for such a
zone, it is, apparently, not liable to sinking without warning unless it fails
to conform to the belligerent's instructions concerning communications, in
which case it "may thereby assume enemy character and risk being fired upon
or captured. "107 It is by no means clear that these asserted rules, though
admirable in their restraint, are consistent with the current law of naval
warfare. To the extent that such areas of operation would ever purport to
authorize the sinking of neutral merchant ships without warning, they would
run up against the judgment of the International Military Tribunal in the
Doenitz case.
Because we can expect that exclusion zones or zones of operation will
continue to be asserted, in particular in limited wars, perhaps it would be
worth the effort to attempt to provide by treaty a set of negotiated rules
that balance the perceived needs for protection of belligerent forces in the
modern age of long-distance targeting, the interests of neutral shipping, and
the humanitarian principles that led the Nuremberg Tribunal to condemn
unrestricted naval warfare zones.
Other targets of submarines. The Handbook's rules on enemy vessels that
are immune or exempt from targeting are the same for surface warships and
submarines and therefore receive no detailed discussion here. The Handbook
does make it clear that enemy hospital ships complying with the appropriate
rules on marking and behavior are not lawful targets for surface warships
or submarines. Other enemy vessels immune from attack, according to the
Handbook, include coastal fishing vessels and small coastal traders. Civilian
passenger vessels are said to be subject to capture but exempt from
destruction. lOS
The Handbook's treatment of the law of conventional-weapon naval
bombardment ofland targets again makes no distinction between surface ships
and submarines (or, for that matter, aircraft).1 09 In general, the stated rules
set forth the particular prohibitions on targeting civilian populations,
inflicting unnecessary suffering, and wanton destruction of property. There
is no suggestion that these rules present special issues for submarines.
Submarine weaponry. The Handbook also makes no distinction between
surface ships and submarines in discussing the law of mine-laying. It basically
sets forth the rules derived from the Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907,110 to
which the u.s. remains a party. In order to comply with the rule that
torpedoes disarm after missing their intended targets, the Handbook states that
"[a]ll u.s. Navy torpedoes are designed to sink to the bottom and become
harmless upon completion of their propulsion run. "111 It would seem that the
duration of the propulsion runs of the array of modern torpedo weapons would
be an important consideration for promulgating rules of engagement for
submarines.
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The Handbook contains only one sentence that might be deemed a specific
response to the above-noted debate on the lawfulness of submarine-launched
cruise missiles. It states in full:
Missiles and projectiles dependent upon over-the-horizon or beyond-visual-range
guidance systems are lawful, provided they are equipped with sensors, or are employed
in conjunction with external sources of targeting data, that are sufficient to ensure
effective target discrimination. 1I2

This sentence, however, purports to be an extension of the general obligation
of belligerents, recognized in the Handbook, to avoid weapons that are
indiscriminate in their effect. But a weapon is not indiscriminate "simply
because it may cause incidental or collateral civilian casualties, provided such
casualties are not foreseeably excessive in light of the military advantage
expected to be gained. "113 This is apparently another reference to the military
necessity/humanity formula and perhaps deserves a little more explanation,
including the concept of proportionality and doubt-erasing presumptions.
Otherwise, the discussion is probably an accurate restatement of the general
rules on conventional weapons and weapons systems.
Nuclear weapons present quite another problem, one which the Handbook,
like the author of this chapter, largely avoids. It does, however, state a
position, unlike the author. It states that "[t]here are no rules of customary
or conventional international law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear
weapons in armed conflict. "114 Thus, the Handbook concludes that the use of
nuclear weapons "against enemy combatants and other military objectives"
is legal. But launch of attacks against civilian populations "as such" is not
lawful.ll5 Because United States submarines are among our most important
launching platforms for nuclear weapons, this issue is one of importance to
the law of submarine warfare. It is to be expected that a U.S. Navy guidebook
on the law of naval warfare would take the position that these awesome
weapons, so significant in the very definition of our defensive forces if not
our nation itself, are legal weapons of war. But, of course, the question is
far more complex and confused than the Handbook suggests. 116 The full analysis
of the question is, however, beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Submerged passage. On this, another controversial issue, the Handbook
again takes the expected position: submerged transit through neutral
territorial seas that form all or part of a strait used for international navigation
is permitted in accordance with the customary rules articulated in the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea.ll7 As noted above, this is not necessarily
the rule; instead, the general innocent passage requirement that a submarine
surface and show its flag in neutral territorial seas could well be the current
law.
Regarding archipelagic sealanes passage, the Handbook restates the U.S.
position that it is willing to recognize the right of archipelagic states to
establish archipelagic waters, provided they do so in accordance with the
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provisions of the 1982 treaty, which, in the u.s. view, allow submerged
passage, even in wartime, through designated sea lanes. 11s This position does
not seem to be inconsistent with international law.

Conclusion
Naval command in modern wartime unquestionably carries a terrible
burden of responsibility-to superior officers, to those commanded, to the
ship, to the mission, to the nation, and to those innocent persons who somehow
might come within the broad zones of danger posed by today's weapons
systems. Many rules guide the commander's decisions as he attempts to cope
with his tremendous burden. Not all of these rules are called "law," but even
those that are so designated are recognized because they are in the national
or military interest or both. The nature of the submarine as a weapons system
makes the submarine commander's wartime task of attempting to comply with
the traditional law of naval warfare an especially difficult one. As this chapter
has tried to explain, the submarine's nature and the experiences of the two
world wars have led to some modifications of the traditional law , particularly
regarding the submarine's role as commerce raider.
The u.s. Navy's new Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
presents an impressive exposition of the law of naval warfare as it relates
to submarines. It is concise, readable, and, for the most part, an accurate
reflection of the current law. The few specific comments and criticisms set
forth in this chapter are not, in light of the overall scope of the book's
treatment of the topic, highly significant. Two larger matters, however,
remain bothersome, though they each go beyond the submarine topic.
First, the Handbook seldom refers to any clear distinction between rules that
apply in total wars, such as World War II, and today's more likely armed
confrontation, a war that is limited in geographical scale or objectives or both.
The distinction is particularly critical for the issues that surround the conduct
of submarine warfare. War fighting conduct that might be expected, even
appropriate (perhaps even lawful), during a global conflagration in which
warring nations struggle for their very existence does not necessarily provide
precedent for the conduct oflimited war, as recent events probably confirm.
Some aspects of the traditional laws of naval warfare that seemed so outmoded
or obsolete in the context of World War II-for example, the provisions
of the 1936 London Protocol-might make sense again in the context of
limited war.
The second problem is one that naval commanders, including especially
submarine commanders, must anticipate: what to do in cases of doubtful
targetability. Where the hard choice is between military necessity and
humanity, which side wins? Where lies the presumed answer? The rules that
attempt to balance military necessity and humanity are many and complex.
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It is obviously one thing to state them or even know them in all their
exception- and qualification-festooned glory; it is undoubtedly quite another
actually to attempt to apply them in instant decision under the stress of
imminent hostile engagement. As suggested in earlier discussion, anticipation
of the dilemma calls for a presumption or set of presumptions designed to
guide decision in doubtful cases, and the Handbook could benefit from the
inclusion of a section on this problem.
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